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PROPERTY, TAXATION, AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
WHAT DOES A FAIR SOCIETY OWE
CHILDREN-AND THEIR PARENTS? 1
Anne L. Alstott*
What role do-and should-parents play in a fair society, taking the
term fair society in a Rawlsian sense? Over time, our society's
demands on parents have steeply increased, while the economic
rewards of child-rearing have diminished. At one time, children were
an emotional and economic bonus, providing workers for the farm or
factory as well as security in old-age. For today's parents, in contrast,
child-rearing is a one-way obligation: parents spend time and money
preparing their offspring for modern life, without expecting much
other than love in return.
Today, society expects parents to do the intensive work of
preparing children for modern life. We expect parents to invest far
more time and money in their children than ever before; we rely on
parents to give priority to their children's needs for nearly two
decades; and we expect them to do so without much economic reward.
Slowly but surely, a combination of technological, social, and legal
change has transformed modern parenthood into an extraordinarily
demanding social role-and one that carries a built-in tension
between meeting our children's needs and pursuing lives of our own.
But should we understand the demands of modern child-rearing to
be a matter for public concern? Or should we, instead, conceive of
parenthood as an essentially personal endeavor? On this latter view,
parenthood is a private project and nothing more: Every individual is
free to choose parenthood, or to reject it, but parents have no special
claim on state assistance.
In this Article, I challenge the private project view, drawing on a
line of argument that I develop in my forthcoming book, No Exit.2
Using principles adapted from the work of John Rawls and other
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Jim Fleming for inviting me to
the "Rawls and the Law" Symposium and to Linda Sugin, Tom Nagel, and Bob
Cooter for an excellent panel discussion.
1. See Anne L. Alstott, No Exit (forthcoming Spring 2004). The material in this
Article is adapted from the book with permission of Oxford University Press.
2. Alstott, supra note 1.
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liberal egalitarians, I argue that a fair society does owe a special
obligation to parents.
Society expects-and needs-parents to
provide their children with continuity of care, meaning the intensive,
intimate care that human beings need to develop their intellectual,
emotional, and moral capabilities. And society expects-and needsparents to persist in their role for eighteen years, or longer if needed.
A variety of social and legal institutions convey a common message:
Do what it takes to give your children the continuing care that they
need. Put simply, "Do Not Exit."
Society's "No Exit" command to parents is grounded in a deep and
appropriate commitment to human dignity and equality. If every
child is to have a fair start in life, we cannot authorize parents to act in
any way they wish. A society that seeks to protect the life chances of
every person cannot be indifferent to the conditions of child-rearing.
We understand that society owes every child the conditions she needs
to flourish-every child deserves a parent who will not exit.
But from a parent's perspective, "No Exit" has a double edge.
Continuity of care is good for children and for society too, because
well-cared-for children can grow into autonomous adults. But at the
same time the "No Exit" command promotes children's interests, it
also burdens parents' opportunities. We can acknowledge the moral
and emotional satisfactions of parenthood while also recognizing that
parents provide continuity to their children at considerable cost to
themselves. The "No Exit" obligation can severely limit the ordinary
jobs, and ordinary lives, that parents can choose to live.
In response, a fair society ought to take measures to lighten the
autonomy burden of child-rearing. The goal should not be to render
child-rearing costless. It would be impossible, as well as unwise, to
attempt to erase any imprint of parenthood on parents' lives. Most
parents derive great pleasure and satisfaction from their children, and
many can hardly imagine a childless life. But the fact that parents
choose their path should not obscure the unique "No Exit" burden
that attends parenthood. Society may fairly expect parents to remain
with their children for the long term, but it should not ignore the
consequences of that dictate for parents' own lives. Child-rearing
should be a life stage, and not a life sentence.
I. WHAT IS CONTINUITY OF CARE?
Continuity of care requires parents to take on a dual role. Put
succinctly, parents must be both nurturers and advocates, and they
must continue in both roles until the child is grown.
This much seems familiar and intuitive. It is obvious that children
need nurturing. And a moment's reflection confirms the importance
of advocacy, too-young children cannot speak for themselves, and
even older children may not be able to identify and articulate what
they need from schools and other institutions. But what does
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continuity add to the idea of care? Why is it important that each
parent continue in his or her role for the long term?
A. How Continuity Fosters Children'sDevelopment
Joseph Goldstein offered a striking account of the importance of
continuity of care for children. Writing with Anna Freud and Albert
Solnit, Goldstein emphasized the importance of continuing care
provided by one (or more) "psychological parents." 3 The authors
explained that every child needs "unbroken continuity of affectionate
and stimulating relationships with an adult."' The goal for society,
they wrote, should be to ensure "each child a chance to be a member
of a family where he feels wanted and where he will have the
opportunity, on a continuing basis, not only to receive and return
affection, but also to express anger and to learn to manage his
aggression."5
I begin with Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit because their theory has
become a touchstone in family law. The basics of their psychological
theory of continuity have been widely accepted, and their 1973 book is
still cited, with approval, by leading family law scholars today.6 The
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit books have been controversial primarily
for their legal prescriptions and not their psychological insights.7
Even those who disagree with the authors' proposals for legal reform
acknowledge that there is near-consensus on children's need for
continuity of care.8
3. See Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979);
Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1st ed., 1973); Joseph
Goldstein et al., In the Best Interests of the Child (1986). A second edition of the
1973 book was published in 1979 with a helpful epilogue, and so I usually cite to that
version. See Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (2d ed.,
1979) [hereinafter Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed.].
4. Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed., supra note 3, at 6.
5. Id. at 5-6.
6. E.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody's Children 39 (1999); Mary Ann Mason,
The Custody Wars 89 (1999); Carol Sanger, Separating From Children, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 375, 443 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries,81
Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2412 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPreferences,and
Child Custody, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 630 (1992).
7. Critics of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's psychology tend not to attack the
continuity norm itself, but instead challenge psychoanalysis or the authors' legal
prescriptions. See David Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating the Rights of
Parents of Children in Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 501 (1983-84);
Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parentingvs. Attachment Theory:
The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things for the Wrong
Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 505 (1983-84). For a response, see Joseph
Goldstein, In Whose Best Interest?, in Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 47 (Jay
Folberg ed., 1984).
8. The focus of debate has been the authors' recommendation that courts in
custody disputes should award custody to just one psychological parent, granting her
(or him) the legal right to deny visitation by the other parent. Indeed, "Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit" became fighting words to some fathers' rights groups. See Mason,
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The heart of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit theory is the
observation that children rely on their psychological parents to create
a stable environment and set of close relationships in which the child
can accomplish his developmental tasks. Good parents, for example,
feed and soothe infants, and begin to establish routines that help
infants learn to "tolerate postponement of gratification and inevitable
frustration." 9 Later in the child's development, good parents provide
appropriate praise and discipline, laying "the first foundations for the
child's own control of his drives and impulses, the lessening of his
selfishness, and the beginning of consideration for others."1 Parents
also provide role models for attitudes and values with which the child
can identify. During the rebellions of adolescence, parents offer a
stable relationship, permitting the child to experiment with rejection
and distance without rejecting the child in return."
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit worry that adults systematically
underrate the challenge of being a child:
Physical, emotional, intellectual, social, and moral growth does not
happen without causing the child inevitable internal difficulties. The
instability of all mental processes during the period of development
needs to be offset by stability and uninterrupted support from
external sources. Smooth growth is arrested or disrupted when
upheavals and12 changes in the external world are added to the
internal ones.
Throughout the child's development, stability is key-it is crucial
that children be able to rely on a parent's continuing presence.
Disruptions in continuity of care can inflict serious psychological
trauma on children. Children, say the authors, are egocentric and have
difficulty maintaining equilibrium when their environment and
relationships are disrupted. 3 They may experience disruption as a
personal attack or rejection; and they "respond to any threat to their
emotional security with fantastic anxieties, denial, or distortion of
reality, reversal or displacement of feelings-reactions which are no
help for coping, but rather put them at the mercy of events."' 4
The continuity principle distills a basic insight-supported by
common sense as well as psychology-that children do best when they
maintain a long-term relationship with at least one caring adult. This
insight does not demand allegiance to any particular school of childsupra note 6, at 88. But for my purposes, what is striking about the joint-custody
controversy is that continuity of care plays a crucial role on both sides of the debate,
with critics contending, in effect, that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have misapplied
their own principles.
9. Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed., supra note 3, at 14.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 34.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id. at 32-34.
14. Id. at 12.
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rearing or child psychology. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were
psychoanalysts, but continuity of care has also been advanced by
attachment theorists. While psychoanalysis and attachment theory
represent quite distinct approaches to child psychology, both endorse
continuity of care (in the general formulation I have presented) as an
important value in guiding arrangements for children's care. 5
It is worth emphasizing that continuity of care does not rely on
maternal-bonding theories. These spring up from time to time in the
popular press, warning that any working mother is doing lasting
damage to her children. But these extreme views are empirically
questionable, and in any event they represent neither mainstream
attachment theory nor the views of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. The
modern view is that children may develop attachments with multiple
caretakers, and nothing in the psychological parent theory requires
parents to refrain from working-or to devote their every moment to
their child. Empirical studies have generally rejected the simple
prediction that maternal employment compromises children's
development.16 While continuity of care emphasizes a loving bond
between parent and child, it also recognizes that children develop such
bonds with more than one parent, and that appropriate use of a
substitute caregiver will not disrupt the parent-child relationship. 7
Continuity, then, is an integral part of nurture-children need a
sense of stability and permanence that helps them navigate the
challenges of growing up. But the psychological bond between parent
and child serves a second function as well: Continuity helps parents
act as effective representatives for their children in the wider world.
B. How Continuity Protects Children's Interests
Today, children interact with a variety of large, impersonal
institutions. The assumption that parents will faithfully represent
their children's interests is ingrained in virtually all our public
institutions for children's care. Public education and healthcare rely
15. For an account of continuity of care that draws on a variety of psychological
sources, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
Va. L. Rev. 879, 902-11 (1984); for an account of continuity based on attachment
theory (and vehemently rejecting psychoanalysis), see Waters & Noyes, supra note 7.
For a nuanced discussion of the differences and commonalities between
psychoanalysis and attachment theory, see Peter Fonagy, Attachment Theory and
Psychoanalysis (2001).
16. For a critical debunking of mother-infant bonding theories, see Diane E. Eyer,
Mother-Infant Bonding (1993). For research on attachments to multiple caretakers,
see Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at
Divorce: Social Science Research and the American Law Institute's Approximation
Rule, 40 Fain. Ct. Rev. 350 (2002); for a review of studies of maternal employment,
see Sanger, supra note 6, at 434-38, 478-83.
17. See Eyer, supra note 16; Kelly & Ward, supra note 16; Sanger, supra note 6, at
434-38, 478-83.
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especially heavily on the parent's role as advocate for her child.
Teachers and medical personnel can provide expert advice, but their
diagnoses often rely on the parent's close observation of the child.
Parents may seek special programs or treatments for a sick or disabled
child, or they may actively contest a proposed course of therapy. One
vivid example comes from special education. Although federal law
requires public schools to provide a free and appropriate public
education, parents' repeated experience is that they play a crucial role
in asserting their children's rights and in ensuring that the schools
provide educational programs appropriate for a particular child. 8
Even good institutions cannot function without parental
participation and advocacy. We will never be able to create
impersonal care that mimics personal care-we will never train
teachers who know our children as we do, or doctors or nurses who
remember every critical detail of the child's medical history.
Once again, continuity is a critical component of parental care.
Parents are more likely to act with greater fidelity to children's
interests if they bond to children over the long term. When parents
have a close emotional tie to their children, they can promote the
child's interests most effectively. When parents know that they are
responsible for the child for the long term, they may more feel a
greater stake in the child's life. And parents who persist with their
children develop expertise about their children that neither the state
nor shorter-term caretakers can match. 19
To see the point, compare a parent's role with the role of other
representatives for children.
In different settings, various
professionals may speak on children's behalf-teachers, doctors,
caseworkers, even lawyers in a courtroom setting.
These
representatives bring special expertise, but they are most effective
when they work with parents. Their formal training is not designed to
substitute for the knowledge and intensity that a parent brings to the
table. Parents' long-term, close, and continuing relationship with their
children creates a depth of knowledge and personal identification that
cannot be duplicated in shorter-term or more casual relationships.
II. SHOULD SOCIETY EXPECT PARENTS TO PROVIDE CONTINUITY
OF CARE?

One of the standard cases taught in almost any family law course is
Painter v. Bannister,20 which illustrates just how painful the demands
of continuity can be for parents. The case is a custody dispute
18. See, for example, the advice, guidelines, and model correspondence offered by
the Autism-PDD Resources Network website, at www.autism-pdd.net (last visited
Feb. 17, 2004).
19. This line of argument is developed in both Scott & Scott, supra note 6, and
Emily Buss, "Parental"Rights, 88 Va. L. Rev. 635 (2002).
20. 140 N.W. 2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
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involving seven-year-old Mark Painter, and the contesting parties are
his father, Harold Painter, and his (maternal) grandparents, the
Bannisters. When Mark was five, his mother and baby sister died in a
car crash, leaving Harold and his five-year-old son, Mark, to pick up
the pieces of their lives. Harold decided to leave Mark with his
grandparents in Iowa for a while.2' Mark had a rocky time at first: he
was aggressive toward smaller kids, cruel to animals, and disliked by
his peers. But he grew to love his grandparents, the Bannisters, and to
depend on them. Although Mark remained somewhat anxious in
personality, he ultimately developed a closer and more secure
relationship with his grandfather than he had had with Harold.2 2
Harold returned after an absence of fifteen months. He had
remarried and found a house in California, and he was eager to bring
Mark along to make a fresh start with his new family. But Mark's
grandparents objected: They worried that Mark could regress if he
left the environment in which he was (by then) thriving. 3
In the end, the Iowa Supreme Court decided that Mark should stay
with his grandparents. 4 In reaching its decision, the court relied
heavily on the testimony of a child psychologist, who testified that
Mark's grandfather had replaced his father as the primary "father
figure" in the child's life. 25
The psychologist emphasized the
importance of stability and continuity for Mark, and he worried that
Mark's more tenuous relationship with Harold would be insufficient
to sustain the child through the stress of another family transition.
Some critics view Painterv. Bannister as an artifact from the culture
wars of the 1960s. On this view, the Iowa Supreme Court simply
indulged its own cultural prejudices, discounting Harold's love for his
son in light of his "Bohemian approach to finances and life in
general, 2 6 and endorsing instead the more familiar, Midwestern
values of the Bannister family.27
But Painter v. Bannister is more complicated than that. The
dilemma of continuity of care is a wrenching one, and the Iowa
Supreme Court's opinion attempted to deal with it seriously. Harold
had his heart set on taking Mark back, and he considered his son's
21. Id. at 153.
22. Id. at 156-57.
23. Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 156.
25. Id. at 157.
26. Id. at 154.
27. See, e.g., William Louis Tabac, Give Them a Sword: Representing a Parent in a
Child Custody Case, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 267, 275 n.48 (1996) (calling Painter a
"notorious example" of judges deciding cases based on their own values); Judith L.
Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes,
86 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 123 n.23 (1986) (discussing Painter v. Bannister and stating
that "fj]udges seldom use 'best interests' analysis so blatantly as a vehicle for imposing
their own values on their decisions").
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stay with the Bannisters a temporary measure-nothing more.
Harold's exit is a very human reaction to tragedy: Imagine how
devastating it would be to lose a beloved partner and a child in a car
accident. It seems cruel to dismiss Harold's pain or to expect him not
to act out in some fashion. Some people might respond to catastrophe
with fortitude, but others might become depressed or need to exit the
scene for a while, as Harold did.
Still, even as we sympathize with Harold, we can question whether
he did the right thing. If Harold was in pain, imagine what five-yearold Mark must have felt. He lost his mother and sister and then, for
more than a year, his father too. Fifteen months can be a long time in
the life of a small boy, and during that time Mark made an important
emotional adjustment-he came to feel secure in the Bannister family.
It was the Bannisters, who must have been feeling considerable pain
themselves (Mark's mother was their daughter), who stepped up to
recreate continuity for Mark-to provide him with a family where he
felt wanted.28 When Harold reappeared, with a new wife, it might
have been too much to expect Mark to leave the Bannisters and make
yet another transition.
There is a postscript to Painter v. Bannister, and it does little to
resolve the ambiguity. Two years after the court decision, Mark asked
to live with his father, and the Bannisters consented.29 Is that proof
that the court's initial decision was wrong? Or evidence that two
more years with his grandparents helped Mark recover sufficient
equanimity to make a choice that (this time) his grandparents felt was
reasonable?
The larger significance of Painterv. Bannister is that it demonstrates
the potential conflict between parents' needs and children's needs:
Harold needed to leave, but Mark needed him to stay. Even in less
dramatic circumstances, parents encounter these conflicts all the time.
Parents may want, or need, to take (or leave) a job, to marry (or to
leave a marriage), or simply to change a way of life they have come to
dislike. But their children need something else. Perhaps the family
needs the money that the hated job brings in. Or perhaps the children
need so much care that a demanding job can no longer be managed.
Perhaps a fianc6 demands a geographic move or other changes that
would too seriously disrupt the children's sense of stability. Just as in
Harold's case, we may have conflicting intuitions about how parents
should act in these cases. We want parents to do what is best for the
children. But parents also deserve to have lives of their own.

28. See Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed., supra note 3, at 5 (describing
guidelines for judicial decisions for child placement).
29. Judith Areen, Family Law 1259 (1999).
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How should we think about these conflicts? Is it fair to expect
parents to provide continuity of care to their children, when doing so
requires serious compromises in the lives parents wish to live?
A. Children and the Conditions of Autonomy
These are deep questions about the nature of child-rearing in a fair
society. One way to approach these questions is to consult the
underlying principles that guide the organization of our society.
Individual autonomy is one such value: Many of our laws and
institutions seek to make it possible for every person to live a life that
is autonomous-a meaningful life of her own choosing. On liberal,
egalitarian principles, one central function of the state is to create
institutions that ensure to every person the conditions of autonomythe chance to develop the capabilities that she will need to formulate,
choose, and pursue a vision of the good life.
If we are committed to the ideal of autonomy for everyone, we
should create institutions to provide the conditions of autonomy to
every child-the material, intellectual, and emotional preconditions
that permit human beings to develop the capacity to be self-governing.
For instance, a fair society should provide universal education,
including not only skills training, but also the chance to explore
diverse visions of the good. Although liberal theory has somewhat
less to say about the role of family life in children's development, most
theorists seem to agree that children deserve parental time and
attention sufficient to cultivate their capabilities.3"
My point is that continuity of care should be an integral part of this
ideal of child-rearing. Although theorists debate precisely what
capabilities each individual may need, continuity of care represents a
minimal, threshold requirement-a foundation for building whatever
additional capabilities children may need.
Children need continuity of care to flourish: Outside of science
fiction, there simply is no acceptable substitute for parental care. Of
course, the law cannot prevent all disruptions in continuity: death,
divorce, illness, and other calamities will always occur. Children can
recover from these traumas, but they do so most effectively when a
new family (or custody arrangement) recreates continuity of care.
While continuity can be recreated, though not easily or without pain,
some degree of continuity is essential: In the rare cases in which
children are deprived of continuity for long periods or during
formative stages, they suffer serious and lasting emotional problems.31
30. The importance of families as the first school for citizens is a central theme in
Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989). See also John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 462-72 (1971); Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal
State 139-67 (1980).
31. Several studies document the suffering of children who lose psychological
parents to death or voluntary exit, and they emphasize that one of the key
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The conditions of autonomy for children are so central to a fair
society that they merit some degree of priority (how much, I will
discuss below) over parents' (and other adults') competing claims to
autonomy and privacy. To see why, imagine a group of people
gathered together in the Rawlsian original position. To ensure that
everyone's interests are represented, the assembly includes adults
from the present generation as well as children who will not be born
for some time yet. And to guarantee impartiality, the participants do
not know to which generation they belong. What guidelines would
these representatives adopt for children's care? How would they
balance children's need for care against adults' wish to exercise their
autonomy?
Contractarian
hypotheticals of this type often produce
indeterminate results, because it is difficult to determine, from
abstract premises, the terms of the agreement that such
representatives would reach. Would most people prefer institutions
that promise greater freedom, or greater security? Would they favor
an economy that produces more consumer goods, or more leisure
time?
But in this case, the answer follows from the structure of a society
committed to equality and autonomy-and not from a contingent
prediction about individual tastes. Suppose, as Rawls suggests, that
the representatives would choose a society that would seek to provide
every individual with a meaningful chance to choose and to pursue her
own vision of the good life. 2 That kind of society is possible only if
prescriptions for recovery is to maintain a continuing relationship with the remaining
caretaker. See Brigid Daniel, et al., Child Development for Child Care and Protection
Workers 93-94 (1999); Douglas Davies, Child Development 67-68 (1999); Suzanne D.
Dixon & Martin T. Stein, Encounters With Children 505-09, 561-62 (2000)
(documenting divorce and parental death). For studies of children deprived of
parental (or substitute) care for extended periods, see Michael Cole & Sheila R. Cole,
The Development of Children 251-57 (1989).
32. Some critics contend that representatives in the original position would not
reach that result, but I will not engage that larger debate here; instead, I begin with
Rawlsian principles that have held wide appeal, despite the debate over their
derivation. For readers who are methodological sticklers, I point out that there are
other ways of reaching the result I describe in the text. For instance, we might follow
Dworkin's method of asking what kind of "insurance" each person would buy-would
each person (hypothetically) agree to purchase "continuity of care" insurance?
Although Dworkin does not address this question, he uses a similar method to
address other questions of social organization. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000) [hereinafter Dworkin, Sovereign
Virtue]; Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 283 (1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, Equality of Resources].
We can reasonably suppose that the answer is yes, because continuity of care
is a basic building block for human development. Alternatively, consider Ackerman's
assembly, governed by the principle that no individual can assert she is better than
another. Only someone who had already had continuity of care could meaningfully
stand up in the assembly and assert that she rejected continuity; and if such an adult
asserted that her values were more important than continuity for the next generation,
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children have developmentally-sound conditions for their upbringing.
Only autonomous people can participate (meaningfully) in choosing a
vision of the good life; and continuity of care is at least necessary,
although probably not sufficient, for the development of children's
autonomy.
Because children are human beings, they deserve developmental
conditions that give them a chance to develop the capabilities that let
them define and choose a vision of the good. At a minimum, then,
each child should have a caretaker committed to providing continuity
of care, because only such a caretaker will give the child a good
chance to develop the capabilities she needs to participate in society.
Some liberal, egalitarian theorists have imagined something close to
an ideal of continuity of care, without quite hitting the mark. Rawls,
for example, assumes that families will exist and that they will provide
children with early moral instruction. In a brief passage on childrearing (intended to illustrate how family life instructs children in
moral authority), he seems to be reaching for continuity of care as he
emphasizes parents' intimate relationship with the child and the
importance of the stability of that relationship over time.33 Ackerman
emphasizes that the task of public education is to liberate children
from their parents' views and social context-to give children a sense
of the wider possibilities for life in a pluralistic society.34 Still, he
concedes, the family has a constructive role to play: Children rely on
their parents to give them "cultural coherence" that acts as a
foundation for ventures into the wider world.35 Continuity of care is
one way of understanding just how families do this.
We can imagine an objection to the contractarian hypothetical.
Suppose that an adult representative stands up and asserts, "I do not
particularly value the development of children's autonomy, and I do
not want to squander my time or society's other resources on
continuity of care. I would far rather spend my resources, and have
our society spend its resources, on more important matters. Thus, I
am perfectly willing to forgo continuity of care as a child in return for
greater freedom to rear my own children as I choose once I am an
adult."
This objection is plausible at first, but a closer look reveals its
defect. The speaker is improperly asserting that her values-her wish
to devote her resources on other pursuits-are more important than
children's claims to the continuity of care they need to develop their
autonomy. Children are human beings in their own right, and their
a member of the next generation (recall that Ackerman's assembly abstracts from
temporal constraints) could stand up and object, decisively in Ackerman's scheme, "I
am just as good as you." Ackerman, supra note 30, at 15.
33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 30, at 463-64.
34. Ackerman, supra note 30, at 139-67.
35. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
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claim to the conditions of autonomy follows from their equal worth as
individuals. Continuity of care is, in this sense, part of the bedrock of
egalitarian society, and not an optional pursuit that can readily be
traded off against other possible uses of society's resources. The
question is not whether society should subsidize modern art, build a
space station, or engage in some other optional endeavor that a fair
society might, or might not, endorse. Instead, continuity implicates a
foundational question: Whether every child should be entitled to the
conditions of autonomy (as we understand them, today, in this
society).
Continuity of care cannot be an elective value in an egalitarian
society. It cannot be up to parents to decide whether they endorse
continuity or instead would prefer to spend their time and money on
other things. Instead, continuity of care is part of the basic package
that every individual ought to have if she is to grow up to be a fully
autonomous person, and a full participant in a liberal, egalitarian
society.
This rationale implies that the state should expect parents to give
priority in their lives to continuity of care for their children.36 I hasten
to add that parents need not be slaves to their children in order to
provide them with continuity. In the ordinary case, it is acceptable,
even desirable, for caretakers to pursue independent activities and
relationships. The psychological and social functions of continuity can
all be satisfied by caretakers who hold jobs (or not), who are married
(or not) and who hold diverse views about how to accomplish the dayto-day work of child-rearing. Parents may be strict or lenient, anxious
or casual, conventional or idiosyncratic.
What is essential to
continuity is "direct, intimate, and continuous" care by one or more
parents who persist in the work of child-rearing over time.37
Thus, although parents should have considerable freedom to
organize their lives as they choose, when continuity itself is at stake, a
parent's own wishes should yield to the child's needs. Ordinarily, for
instance, a child should not be deprived of her parents for periods that
are unacceptably long given the child's developmental stage-so long
that the child experiences a serious disruption in continuity of care. A
parent who is severely emotionally troubled or disengaged for long

36. For principles along these lines, see Jeffrey Blustein, Parents and Children
103-14 (1982). Blustein proposes that:
parents have a right to satisfy their own individual interests, parental and
nonparental, as long as this is consistent with the satisfactory performance of
their parental duties. These interests include the need for a certain degree of
privacy within the family, the desire to engage in activities unrelated to
child-rearing, and the desire to care for a child.
Id. at 113.
37. The phrase is from Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed., supra note 3,
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periods may also disrupt continuity. And, of course, continuity is
incompatible with parental neglect or abuse in any form.
This simple formulation does not begin to address every hard case.
For instance, what about a parent who is very ill-should the child's
care take priority over the parent's needs then? Or what about a
parent who has many children, some of whom have greater needs than
others-is it ever acceptable to compromise continuity for some in
order to provide it to others? I will not attempt to answer these
questions fully here: My aim is to explain and justify the priority of
continuity of care for the majority of parents in ordinary situations,
rather than to craft ethical rules suited to extraordinary cases.
Still, continuity of care suggests some relevant considerations.
Depending on the circumstances, a parent who cannot meet her
child's needs should be expected to make arrangements for her child
to be cared for by others-temporarily or permanently. Continuity
puts a premium on maintaining the parent-child relationship if
possible-but if that relationship is severely disrupted for a long
period, it may be better to take steps to recreate continuity with
another family. (This is, of course, the ongoing dilemma that the
foster-care system faces-when to preserve a troubled or stressed
family for the sake of the pre-existing relationship, and when to place
children with new families.)3 8
What if parents object to the priority rule? Perhaps a parent simply
does not wish to make continuity a priority in her life and prefers to
keep her (exit) options open. Or perhaps a parent holds religious or
personal views that reject continuity. The answer is that such parents
should not be permitted to rear children. This conclusion may seem
harsh at first, but if we keep in mind the importance of continuity for
children's development, it is easier to see why parents should be
expected to provide it. Just as the law denies custody of children to
people who beat, starve, or neglect them, so it should (at least in
theory) deny custody to people who do not intend to provide
continuity of care, even if those people are biological parents.
Biological parenthood may fairly give parents a "first right" to step up
to the duties of caretaking, but it should not be a license for parents to
use children to their own ends-which is what a refusal to provide
continuity of care amounts to. In practice, society cannot detect every
parent who shirks his responsibilities. In principle, however, the law
should expect caretakers to provide children with meaningful
emotional and physical care for the long term.
A more sympathetic objection comes from the parent who is willing
to provide continuity of care under ordinary circumstances, but whose
child-by reason of serious illness or disability-requires
38. For an account of the difficulties in striking the right balance between family
preservation and adoption for foster children, see generally Bartholet, supra note 6.
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extraordinary amounts of care, time and effort. Child-rearing is
usually an eighteen-year obligation, ending when the child reaches
maturity. But some children with mental or physical disabilities may
require longer-term and more intensive care.3 9
How, then, should we respond to the parent who understandably
feels that she did not sign up for this kind of heavy responsibility?
Providing care for children with disabilities can be physically and
emotionally draining. As sympathetic as the parents in such cases are,
however, we should also take into account the child's interests: While
the parent suffers by being made a party to her child's misfortune, the
child will suffer doubly if his disability is compounded by parental
abandonment.
I do not mean to imply that society should deal harshly with parents
who cannot cope:
It would be intolerably smug as well as
counterproductive to punish them or hold them up for censure.
Instead, we should try to recreate continuity for those children whose
parents do exit-and we should try harder to assist those parents who
are willing to remain with their children, but who need extra help to
do so.40
A skeptic might point out that the family does not always play a
hero's role in an egalitarian society. Theorists have worried that
families may perpetuate inequality, because some families do better
than others in preparing their children for success in the wider world.
Some families provide better developmental conditions than others:
Some emphasize reading and send their children to preschools, for
instance, while others do not. And some families have greater wealth,
human capital, and social capital-all of which help provide their
offspring with greater material opportunities than children of families
of more modest means.4 '
But the potential conflict between family inequality and children's
life chances does not undermine the claim that the law ought to
encourage every family to provide continuity of care. Continuity
should be understood as necessary, though not sufficient, for equality.
The law may wish to take other measures to "level up" developmental
conditions for some children:
Universal, public preschool, for
instance, might be a good start. 42 But virtually no one has advocated
39. Not every disability will necessitate continuing parental care: A child who
cannot walk, for example, but who has no other disabilities will generally make the
psychological transition to adult life. Although she may need physical assistance in
some aspects of daily life as an adult, she will ordinarily be able to take responsibility
for arranging her care, and it will not be critical to her psychological well-being that
those tasks be performed by a parent. In contrast, some children with developmental
disabilities may require a parent's care for far longer than eighteen years.
40. See Alstott, supra note 1, ch. 8.
41. See generally James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family
(1983).
42. See generally Barbara R. Bergmann, Saving Our Children from Poverty: What
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"leveling down" by denying some children continuity of care.
Although families are diverse in their resources, interests, and
capabilities, the great majority of them are capable of providing
continuity of care-and indeed, already do so.
B. Parenthoodin Social (and Legal) Context
These principles find expression in our real-world institutions. Our
society expects parents to provide continuity of care to their children,
and to sacrifice their own opportunities if need be.
Most obviously, society requires parents to care for their children.
The law makes parents responsible for feeding, clothing, and
sheltering their children. And state statutes require parents to protect
children from physical and emotional harm, to secure medical care
when necessary, and to see to it that children attend school, typically
until age sixteen.4 3
Society also relies on parents to do much more-to provide not only
day-to-day supervision but real continuity of care as well. Public
schooling can begin as late as age five or six, because the law
presumes that parents provide primary moral and social instruction.
And both the educational and health-care systems demand intensive
participation by all parents, and especially those whose children who
are chronically ill or who suffer disabilities.
C. Carrots and Sticks
Society uses both carrots and sticks to encourage parents to provide
continuity of care. Using the coercive power of law, the state rewards
parents who persist, and punishes parents who exit.
Begin with the carrots: When parents persist with their children,
the state rewards them with a sphere of privacy that is protected from
state intervention.
What lawyers call the doctrine of parental
authority grants parents wide latitude to rear their children as they
choose. Parental decisions can only rarely be challenged by the state,
third parties, or even the children involved. Very generally, the state
has the legal authority to challenge parents' actions only if they
threaten serious harm to the child. The state intervenes in childrearing only in cases of abuse and neglect, and only when these
conditions become apparent to outsiders-teachers, medical
personnel, or neighbors, who report the situation to child-welfare
authorities.
the United States Can Learn from France (1996).
43. For a description of parents' legal duties, see Bartlett, supra note 15, at 885;
Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse, and Adoption Cases 576-96
(1993). Parents whose children do not attend school may be guilty of neglect. See id.
at 592-93. For medical care, see id. at 584-91. For compulsory school-attendance
laws, see Michael J. Dale et al., Representing the Child Client 6.02[5] (2003).
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It may at first seem odd that the state grants parents so much
authority. Although most parents may act responsibly, some do not.
If the goal is to protect the children, wouldn't some children be better
off if the state took a more active role in monitoring parents? But
parental authority is a social institution deliberately structured to
protect and promote continuity of care. The underlying judgment is
that most children are best served when the state gives parents heavy
responsibility accompanied by considerable control."
To see the
point, step back a moment and consider the state's dilemma when it
seeks to ensure continuity of care for children. The state seeks
continuity of care for children, but it confronts two problems. First,
the state cannot monitor parents' actions too closely without putting
continuity at risk. Clumsy intervention by bureaucrats can easily
disrupt family bonds and children's perceptions of their parents as
authoritative and powerful. One can imagine how intrusive and
upsetting it would be if a state-appointed "family counselor" made
weekly home visits to your house, correcting your disciplinary
techniques, soliciting complaints from your child about you, or
pointing out the mess in your kitchen.
The second dilemma is equally serious: The state cannot easily
recreate continuity of care in a substitute family. Even if the state
discovers a mildly suboptimal situation-for example, a parent who is
loving, but sometimes emotionally immature-the state will find it
difficult to predict whether the child might do better in another
household. Removing the child from such a parent might do harm,
since children become deeply attached even to flawed parents.
When the state does intervene, it will have predictable difficulty
arranging a new placement that will be superior to the first one.
Ideally, the state would create a deep pool of thoroughly-screened
foster parents and adoptive parents. But even in theory, it may be
difficult to forecast how a particular caretaker will interact with a
particular child, especially in the difficult situation in which the child
has been removed from parental care. In the real world, the state has
even more limited competence to provide adequate substitute care, as
the dismal state of foster care suggests.45
Faced with these deficits in information, expertise, and
administrative capacity, the state relies on parental authority to
44. The themes in this section draw on Scott & Scott, supra note 6; Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning
Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2493 (1995); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Hatchingthe Egg]; Buss, supra
note 19.
45. Buss, Woodhouse, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, emphasize state
incompetence as a rationale for parental authority.
See Buss, supra note 19;
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 44; Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests,
2d ed., supra note 3.
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promote continuity of care. Because the state can only monitor
formal continuity (i.e., the physical presence of a parent), it adopts
that minimal standard as a proxy for substantive continuity of care,
unless further evidence comes to light showing that parental conduct
is harming the child. The state declines to second-guess parental
decisions, except in cases where the harm to the child is clear and the
risk of disrupting continuity of care is warranted by the certainty (or
high risk) of abuse or neglect.4 6
This regime is not perfect. It leaves some children to live with
parents who may not care for them as assiduously, or take their
interests as seriously, as society would ideally like. Still, parental
authority, as imperfect as it is, is likely to do better at protecting
continuity of care than any alternative regime of active state
intervention. Parental authority not only protects continuity of care
by good parents, but may even improve parental care by marginal
parents. When parents know that their decisions will not be secondguessed by the state, they may act with a greater sense of
commitment. In addition, when parents are confident that they have a
lasting relationship with their children-one that is not likely to be
interrupted by state intervention-they may identify their children's
interests more closely with their own, and act more faithfully to
represent their interests.47
Also, it is important to bear in mind that the state does not grant
parents absolute authority over their children. The law does set
minimal standards for children's care, and it limits parental authority
when necessary to protect children from harm. Generally speaking,
parents must vaccinate their children and seek appropriate medical
care; parents must send children to school; and parents must not
permit children to drive, to go to work at too early an age, or to act
harmfully toward others.48
46. The Supreme Court has also expressed this functional understanding of the
parental-authority doctrine. For example:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions. More importantly, historically it
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (upholding state procedures for committing
minors to state mental hospitals); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000)
(noting the "traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his
or her child").
47. This theme emerges strongly in Scott & Scott, supra note 6, and Buss, supra
note 19.
48. For First Amendment reasons, the state grants somewhat greater latitude to
parents who advance religious reasons for their decisions. Most famously, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, Amish parents were permitted to keep their children out of high
school, even though the state insisted that the children had an independent interest in
an education that could widen their horizons. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Still, even the
religious exceptions have a limited scope: Parents may not generally deny life-saving
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The state's grant of authority to parents is the "carrot"-parents
who provide continuity of care to their children will, for the most part,
be left free to live their family lives as they choose. But the state also
uses a "stick": Parents who violate continuity of care may lose their
opportunity to be parents at all.
We have already seen that when parents abandon their children or
neglect or abuse them, the state grants custody of the children to a
relative or places the child in foster care.4 9 Depending on the
circumstances, an exiting parent may lose his legal status as a parent
(his "parental rights"), and the child may be adopted by others. In
1996, four percent of children lived in a household without a parent;
about half of these lived with a grandparent. 0 In 1999, less than one
percent of American children lived in foster care. 1
But even parents who are not obviously abusive may lose their
opportunity to be parents-if they exit their children's lives. In
52 for instance,
Painter v. Bannister,
Harold paid a high price for
exiting. He lost the opportunity to be a parent-to live with his child
and to share with Mark the values and pursuits that he, Harold, held
dear. The law's message to the next parent who finds himself in
Harold's situation is quite clear: Do not exit.
In a variety of circumstances, people who persist with their children
for the long term are granted a strong preference to remain parents,
while parents who exit or participate only intermittently in their
children's lives may well lose the chance to be parents at all.53 This is

medical treatment to children for religious reasons; and parents may not violate the
child-labor laws even if the children's work is religious in nature. See Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding the application of child-labor laws to a
Jehovah's Witness who took her niece and ward out to sell the Watchtower);
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(upholding a statute authorizing declaration of children as wards of the state for
purposes of permitting blood transfusion over parental religious objection).
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Living Arrangements of Children by Race and
Ethnicity:
Fall
1996,
at
3
tbl.1
(Apr.
2001),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p70-74.pdf.
51. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., The AFCARS
Report, Interim FY 2000 Estimates as of August 2002, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report7.htm.
52. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
53. For example, a line of famous Supreme Court cases involved disputes between
biological fathers and stepfathers. These cases involved mothers who had remarried
and whose husbands wished to adopt the children from the prior marriage, over the
objections of the biological father. In these cases, the stepfathers prevailed, because
they had established long-term relationships with the children-while the biological
fathers had not. In Lehr v. Robertson, the father had not been given notice of the
child's adoption, but the Court emphasized the father's prior failure to take steps to
see or to claim the child. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). In Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court also
approved adoptions by a stepfather when the biological father had little involvement
with his child. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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society's stick: Parents who violate society's no exit command risk
losing their parental authority altogether.
D. Why Does Society Permit Parentsto Exit?
Still, there is a puzzle here. Society depends on parents to provide
continuity of care and encourages them to do so; and when they exit,
the law may deny them the right to be parents at all. But society does
not absolutely oblige parents to remain with their children-it permits
exit for people who simply no longer wish to be parents.
And in fact, many parents do exit their children's lives, leaving the
day-to-day rights and obligations of parenthood to the child's other
parent, or perhaps to a grandparent. Most commonly, one parent
exits in the context of a divorce or a romantic breakup. And typically,
it is the father who exits and the mother who remains as the child's
only, or primary, parent. Today, nearly one-third of American
children live with just one parent, usually their mother. 4 About four
percent of children live in a household without any parent at all, half
of these living with a grandparent."
Although many children in
single-parent (or no-parent) families have warm relationships with
their non-custodial parent(s), many do not; it is not uncommon
for
56
visits, especially by fathers, to diminish after a year or two.
Parental exit clearly is not beneficial from children's point of view.
From children's point of view, the more adults who are committed to
them, the better. And many children form strong and beneficial
attachments to their mothers and fathers when both are present in
daily life-bonds that are severed if one parent exits permanently. In
an ideal world, marital and romantic breakups would not lead to
parental exits: Ideally, all of the important adults in a child's life
should persist in their relationship with the child, even after divorce or
parental separation.57
But the problem is not that society does not aspire to continuity for
every child. Instead, the problem is that society has only limited
means at its disposal to secure continuity. Our laws and institutions

54. Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong.,
Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the
Committee on Ways and Means 1239, 1240 (2000).
55. U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 50, at 3 (tbl. 1).
56. For data on visitation by non-custodial parents, see Eleanor E. Maccoby &
Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child (1992); for accounts of fathers' reasons for
not maintaining post-divorce relationships with their children, see Terry Arendell,
Fathers and Divorce (1995).
57. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit recognize this point, as do attachment theorists.
Joseph Goldstein, In Whose Best Interest?, in Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 47
(Jay Folberg ed., 1984); Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development
Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38
Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 297 (2000); Waters & Noyes, supra note 7.
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can encourage continuity, but they cannot compel the intimacy and
care that are its foundation.
It is no coincidence that most parents who exit do so in the context
of a marital breakup (or a split in a nonmarital relationship). When
parents become hostile, or simply can no longer cooperate with each
other, it may be difficult or impossible for them both to remain in a
close relationship with their child.
Family experts and legal
authorities have worked hard, over the years, to create joint custody
options that could preserve the parent-child relationship even when
the parent-parent relationship dissolves. Although joint custody has
had notable success in some states, it does not work for many
families.5 8
The hard, and unresolved, question about divorce is whether
preserving continuity of care with just one parent is sometimes better
for children than attempting to preserve continuity with both. Some
legal theorists, notably the trio of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
introduced in Part I, advocate sole custody for one parent.5 9 Their
idea is that the law best serves children by recreating in one parent the
parental authority that characterizes the "intact" family. Goldstein
and his co-authors did not imagine that sole custody was ideal; they
acknowledged the value of having continuity with both parents. But
the authors' prescription reflected their deep skepticism about the
law's capacity to compel hostile parties to cooperate in a sharedparenting arrangement.6 °
In contrast, joint custody advocates typically believe that joint
custody can preserve continuity of care with both parents. 61 Although
strict fifty-fifty joint custody is a difficult logistical prescription for
many families, some legal actors, including the august American Law
Institute, are attempting to work out compromise arrangements,
which can preserve the child's relationships with both parents but
without expecting a strictly equal splitting of time.62
But while the legal experts continue the debate, parents quietly
resolve the issue on their own-and they typically choose sole
custody. Nearly eighty percent of custody cases are uncontested, and
in the great majority of these, the mother takes physical custody and
major responsibility for the children's day-to-day care. Joint physical

58. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 6.
59. See Goldstein, Beyond the Best Interests, 2d ed., supra note 3, at 38, 117-18.
60. Id. at 116-21.
61. For a discussion, see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 527-38 (1984).
62. American Law Institute (ALI), Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §
2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998); Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st
Century: How the American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictabilityand Still
Protectthe IndividualChild's Best Interests, 35 Willamette L. Rev. 467 (1999).
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custody remains relatively rare. Ten to thirty percent of cases63 involve
joint custody, with California at the high end of the spectrum.
The point is that the fact of parental exit in divorce does not reflect
any societal lack of interest in the value of continuity of care for
children. Rather, it reflects the difficulty of creating family structures
that can preserve both continuity for children and a marital exit
option for parents. It may be that we need to try harder. Perhaps we
could do more to create support structures for joint custody, offering
intensive counseling and other services to help parents cooperate after
divorce. We might even restrict marital exit, as some experts advise.'
But, to date, our society has not managed to deflect parents from
breaking up, or prevented parents from exiting their children's lives
when they do.
The problem of divorce illustrates the more general point that
society cannot compel parents to care for one another or for their
children. The state does not literally prohibit parental exit-and for
good reason. In most states, parents may technically renounce their
parental rights and responsibilities at any time.65 To be sure, there are
procedural hurdles to be surmounted, and parents who abandon their
children without following the legal process can be prosecuted. But a
parent determined to sever her relationship with her child may do so.
This does not mean that the state is indifferent to parental exit-only
that it is a bad idea to stop parents from exiting when they really wish
to do so. Any parent who genuinely wishes to abandon her child
forever probably should be able to do so-for the child's sake.
Still, the state accommodates parental exit only because it cannot
absolutely prevent it. The state simply cannot coerce the intimacy and
loyalty that characterize true continuity of care.
It would be
counterproductive to put exiting parents in jail. And it would be
ineffectual, and most likely harmful to children, for the police to drag
exiting parents back into their children's lives, kicking and screaming.
The limited power of the law does not imply, however, that the
state treats, or should treat, parental exit with indifference. Given the
critical importance of continuity of care, the state does what it can to
encourage parents to remain, even if they would prefer to exit. The
state's inability to compel continuity should not be taken as apathy.
We can put the point another way. Society expects parents to
provide their children with continuity of care, and it depends on them
to do so. Whether or not an individual wishes to remain a parent, she
ought to do so, and the law depends on her to do so. Parents should
63. See Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 103.
64. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children's Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9
Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & Law 95 (2001).
65. A parent who (in technical terms) seeks to "relinquish" or "surrender" her
parental rights must typically execute a formal document before a judge or legallyapproved witnesses. See Haralambie, supra note 43, § 13.19.
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understand themselves as having a duty not to exit their children's
lives, because society could not function if most parents exited. All of
society's institutions for child-rearing depend upon parental
persistence.
When parents exit, children's care suffers greatly:
Education, health care, and children's basic emotional and social wellbeing are put at risk.
Society does offer escape hatches, which some parents use to escape
an intolerable relationship with an ex-spouse, or to escape a set of
responsibilities that they simply cannot meet. But the existence of
these safety valves does not imply that society endorses parental exit.
In a society that aspires to autonomy for all its citizens, parents should
understand themselves as bound to their children: They have an
obligation not to exit.
Today, most parents, and especially most mothers, provide
continuity of care to their children. Parental exit does happen, too
frequently perhaps, but still we achieve a high degree of continuity for
most children. Ninety-six percent of American children live with at
least one parent, and two-thirds live with two parents. Somehow, the
combination of parental love, social norms, and society's carrots and
sticks, induces most parents to do the right thing, most of the time.
I want to focus on the parents who stay. For this group, the social
problem is not so much an incentive issue as a matter of distributional
fairness. The difficulty is not how to get them to provide continuity of
care to their children; they are already doing that. Instead, the
question is whether the terms of modern parenthood are fair. Are the
rules of the game equitable to those parents who meet their
responsibilities?
III. EXIT AND PARENTAL AUTONOMY
We usually think of parenthood as a mix of blessings and burdens.
Parents have less freedom than non-parents in some important ways,
but most parents love their children and accept their duty to them.
And in America today, almost everyone can decide whether or not to
be a parent. Parents do have special responsibilities, but it is easy
enough to avoid the duties of parenthood: Just don't have kids.
When we portray parenthood this way, it is difficult to see why
society owes parents any extra help. Some people choose to have
children, while others choose not to. There is less and less social
compulsion to have children: The ranks of happy, childless people are
large and growing. We can infer that parents must feel that the
economic costs of child-rearing are worth it. Perhaps parents (and
especially mothers) end up with less financial security, but greater
emotional satisfaction.
But the picture changes if we step back and consider the parental
role in a larger context. Society strongly regulates the content of
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parenthood, and it demands more of parents than ever before.
Individuals can choose whether or not to be parents, but society fixes
the terms of that choice. In effect, society tells parents "Do Not Exit":
It expects parents to persist with their children for the long term, to
give priority to their children's needs, and to sacrifice their own plans,
wishes, and opportunities if need be.
From this analytic distance, we can frame some larger questions:
Has society structured the parental role fairly? When society expects
parents not to exit their children's lives, should society, in return, give
any special consideration to the consequences for parents' lives?
A. The No Exit Obligation
"No Exit" is the flip side of continuity of care. When parents
commit to continuity of care for their children, they limit their own
capacity to exit in two senses. Most obviously, parents undertake to
stay with their children for the long term and not to leave them. But
in addition, continuity of care requires parents to reshuffle their
priorities: Parents must strive to meet their children's material and
emotional needs, and they must, if need be, cabin their own
aspirations and narrow their own opportunities to do so.
Thus, the "No Exit" obligation for parents represents not merely
the duty not to abandon one's children by the roadside, but also the
much harder, more intensive, and crucially important duty to create
the kind of intimacy, stability, and loyalty that Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit describe. Continuity in its fullest sense requires parents deeply
committed to the enterprise of child-rearing-so committed that they
consult their children's interests as much as their own in setting their
life priorities.66
In a sense, the "No Exit" obligation is thoroughly familiar-as we
have seen, it is deeply embedded in the social and legal institutions
that define parenthood. 67 A parent who acts as the state wishes her to
should generally persist as the child's caretaker until the child reaches
adulthood and no longer relies on continuing care for the
development of her capabilities.
That is not a controversial
proposition-indeed it expresses at least part of what most people
would say good parenting is. But if we look beyond parenthood to the
wider social world, we can gain some perspective on how
extraordinary the "No Exit" obligation really is.
Exit occupies a central place in most conceptions of individual
autonomy. Although theories differ, most liberal, egalitarian accounts
imagine that an autonomous individual should be capable of choosing
a life plan that seems good to her, and of modifying that life plan as
66. Eva Kittay has a wonderful account of the "transparent self" that evolves
when a parent cares for a dependent child. Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor (1999).
67. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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her values change over time. To be the "author of his own life," one
should be permitted to choose among a variety of meaningful
options.6 8 And central to the notion of choice is the ability to alter
one's decisions-to define and redefine one's projects and
relationships over time. 69 A person who cannot exit her chosen life
plan is a person whose set of choices is restricted; she is less able to
govern her life than a person who can, even if everyone knows about
the constraint ahead of time.
We have already seen how this abstract proposition becomes very
concrete in parents' lives. Parents commonly find that their economic
options are limited by their child-rearing responsibilities.
And
parents' noneconomic options may also contract. Parents may marry,
decline to marry, or exit a marriage for their children's sake. They
may reject other relationships that they might pursue were they
childless. And they may stay in a community-or leave it-based on
their children's needs rather than their own. Most parents continually
make smaller sacrifices as well, adjusting their expectations and
ambitions downward, a little or a lot, for the sake of these children we
love.
What is less obvious is that the "No Exit" obligation represents an
extraordinary command from the state to parents.
The state
ordinarily seeks to permit every citizen to choose a vision of the good
life, and to shape a life according to that vision. But the "No Exit"
obligation erases some life-planning options on the menu presented to
parents. Child-rearing requires a parent to give reasonable priority to
the child's care-sacrificing, if need be, her own projects and plans.
No matter what new and exciting opportunities come along, no matter
how appealing or socially productive a new project, the parent's duty
to the child should come first. If the new opportunity or relationship
cannot be reconciled with the child's need for care, it should be
declined.
Does this account overstate society's role in defining the obligations
of parenthood? After all, many parents would surely endorse the "No
Exit" obligation as part of their own values. Most parents probably
feel that their sense of obligation to their children comes from
within-and not from society or the state.
It is certainly true that society relies on parents' natural affection
for their children, and their strong sense of duty. Indeed, society tries
to foster the conditions that permit love and responsibility to flourish:
Think of the doctrine of parental authority, which preserves privacy
and personal space for child-rearing. And the law counts on parental

68. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 204 (1986).
69. See id. at 369-78; Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts, and Possibilities, in Law and the Community 219, 221-23 (Allan C.
Hutchinson & Leslie J.M. Green eds., 1989).
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love when it threatens to punish harmful or irresponsible parents by
withdrawing their parental rights.
Still, parental obligation is strongly a social creation as well as a
natural phenomenon. The historical record reveals that it is a mistake
to suppose that parents "naturally" act responsibly toward their
children even in a different social climate. A vivid study by John
Boswell notes that child abandonment has a long history in Europe,
ending surprisingly recently.7" Romans frequently "exposed"
unwanted children, leaving them literally by the roadside to die or to
be enslaved by anyone who picked them up. In the Middle Ages,
parents continued to expose children and to sell them. In the
eighteenth century, in urban France and Italy, from ten to forty
percent of children were abandoned, including children born in
prosperous neighborhoods. It was not only the hard-pressed poor
who gave up their children, but also better-off people who found them
inconvenient. A significant percentage of children even in wealthy
districts were sent to foundling homes, where many died from disease
and neglect.7 1
It is not particularly surprising that parents perceive the "No Exit"
obligation as a matter of personal values rather than a social
command. The "No Exit" duty is so intertwined with parental
emotion and social custom that parents may not be aware of the social
and legal institutions that support and reward their persistence. But
parents' felt experience should not be the gauge of whether the "No
Exit" obligation constrains their lives. It is impossible to disentangle
parents' "pre-social" values from their values as shaped by society.
Indeed, it is one measure of our society's success in securing
continuity of care for children that (most) parents have come to
internalize the "No Exit" obligation, to incorporate it into their own
morality.
But how does the "No Exit" duty create any collective obligation to
parents? Doesn't society regulate people's conduct all the time? Why
should we consider "No Exit" such an extraordinary burden that it
merits special remedial action?
B. "No Exit" as an ExtraordinaryRegulation
The "No Exit" obligation curtails the exercise of two capabilities
that citizens of a free society ordinarily take for granted: the capacity
to set one's own priorities among competing projects or values, and
the capacity to revise one's priorities and projects over time. The "No
Exit" obligation requires parents to give reasonable precedence to
children's needs, and it mandates parental persistence for the long
term, even if parents' values and aspirations change during that time.
70. This is a central theme of John Boswell, The Kindness of Strangers (1988).
71. Id.
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Without the "No Exit" obligation, parents might more easily take and
change jobs and begin and end relationships. They could more
thoroughly exercise their freedom, because they could live only (or
primarily) for themselves, concentrating more fully on the task of selfauthorship.
A free society ordinarily views "No Exit" rules with suspicion. It
cuts against the liberal, egalitarian grain to use the power of the state
to require individuals to persist in a particular way of life. The law
professor Jed Rubenfeld frames an argument for abortion rights in
just this way. Denying women the opportunity to have abortions, he
argues, would amount to requiring them to live a life of the state's
choosing.72 Put another way, banning abortions would be like
imposing a "No Exit" obligation on pregnant women. As long as we
do not understand the fetus to be a child entitled to continuity of care,
such a "No Exit" obligation would be an intolerable and unnecessary
burden on women's capability to determine for themselves the way of
life they wish to pursue.
Similarly, the modern trend in marriage law disfavors "No Exit"
obligations. At one time, in Western societies, marriages were "No
Exit" relationships, at least in theory, because divorce was illegal. (In
practice,
married
individuals
frequently
abandoned
their
relationships, but they could not abandon, at least without fraud, their
legal status as married persons.)
Today, U.S. divorce laws are
relatively liberal, permitting either spouse to exit the relationship.
Most legal theorists approve this liberalizing trend, precisely because
no-fault divorce permits autonomous adults to revise their lives and to
exit relationships. Although some feminists criticize modern divorce
rules for failing to protect the interests of women and children, for the
most part they advocate greater financial awards and the revision of
child-custody standards-rather than prohibitions on divorce.
One might object that parents freely choose to bear (or adopt)
children: No one coerces them into doing so. But voluntary entry
into parenthood cannot justify unlimited regulation of parents' lives.
The state should not be able to harshly regulate fundamental life
activities and then excuse its action on the ground that individuals can
avoid that way of life. An abortion ban, for example, could not be
dismissed as a trivial matter simply because women could avoid the
ban by not having sex. When society commands parents to persist, it
is denying to some people a course of life they might otherwise wish to
pursue-the option to capture the satisfactions of rearing children
while also preserving the opportunity to exit, or to reshuffle one's
priorities if it becomes attractive, or meaningful, to do so.
It is a mistake to dismiss the problem by imagining that only
immature people would want an exit option, or that anyone whose
72. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989).
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values change over time must be lacking in personal discipline. The
disapproval that informs these stereotypes illustrates just how strong
the social and legal norm against exit is. Suppose that a person
committed to social justice came to believe it to be his calling to leave
his children in foster care, intermittently, while he works in an
impoverished country to improve conditions there.
We might
disapprove his choice, but we cannot easily dismiss it as shallowly selfindulgent.
Parents limit their plans in more ordinary ways all the time. A
father may decline a better job that would require mandatory
overtime. A mother may reject a job that requires night-shift work, or
unpredictable hours. Parents with a sick child may put their own
education and career aspirations on hold-for a time or forever.
Parents are constantly living on less, curtailing their ambitions, and
making hard choices for the sake of their children.
These parents may not resent these choices. They may make them
without a second thought, or even with a sense of pride that their
priorities are in the right place. My point is not that parents feel
burdened, but that they are burdened-relative to the baseline of
what childless people may do. A childless person might take the new
job, work the night shift, or stay in college. The parent may not.
C. A LibertarianMistake?
It may seem that this line of argument incorporates a libertarian
mistake: I seem to be treating individual parents as if they have some
"natural" right to exit their children's care when they wish-a right
which society has foreclosed through the "No Exit" obligation. If I
were making this argument, it would indeed be an error. To see the
subtle, but crucial, difference, it is worth taking a few paragraphs to
define the problem more precisely.
Liberal egalitarians normally reject the idea that there is some
meaningful state of nature, or pre-legal state of affairs, which defines a
baseline for measuring individuals' autonomy (and state infringements
of it). Egalitarians theorize that the institutions of a fair society set
the autonomy baseline by defining what individuals should and should
not be permitted to do. Accordingly, liberal egalitarians ordinarily do
not suppose that (legitimate) state regulations infringe individual
autonomy. Take two commonplace examples: If I want to buy a dog,
I assume a legal obligation to keep it on a leash. If I want to operate a
gas station, I must abide by environmental regulations and the labor
laws. All these regulations enjoin me to refrain from taking actions
that I might wish to take: I may not let my dog run loose in the park, I
may not release gasoline fumes into the air, and I may not require
workers to work twenty-four-hour shifts without overtime pay. True,
some or all of these regulations constrain the freedom I would enjoy
in the state of nature. But egalitarians reject that idea: I have no
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"right" to endanger my fellow citizens' safety, nor to pollute their air
or require them to work under inhumane conditions. Put more
abstractly, we treat such regulations as defining the scope of individual
autonomy rather than limiting it.
So why isn't the "No Exit" obligation just another regulation of this
thoroughly familiar type? At first glance, it seems to fit quite readily
into one of the most familiar, and most widely-accepted justifications
for state regulation-the prevention of harm to others. My own
argument emphasizes that parents who exit do lasting harm to their
children. Accordingly, it would seem entirely fair for the state to
enjoin parents not to exit. "No Exit" prevents parents from harming
or exploiting their children, just as the leash laws and environmental
laws prevent harm to neighbors and the labor laws prevent
exploitation of workers.
But this objection is misplaced. I am not arguing that the "No Exit"
rule is inappropriate-that a fair society should reject it. The subtler
insight that I am advancing is this: Not every regulation with a
legitimate purpose imposes a fair burden on those individuals who

pursue the regulated activity. The "No Exit" rule implements the
state's legitimate interest in continuity of care for children, but
simultaneously imposes an extraordinary restriction on parental
autonomy.
Thus, the paradox is that society's "No Exit" command both
expresses the state's legitimate interest in continuity of care for
children and restricts the exercise of parents' autonomy. We can
recognize that "Do Not Exit" is an appropriate command, without
pretending that its consequences for parents are trivial or morally
untroubling.
A philosopher might object that the autonomy burden of the "No
Exit" obligation is not so unusual-isn't it just an example of the wellknown precommitment problem? The precommitment dilemma has
motivated a classic debate among liberal theorists; a brief introduction
will clarify the issues.
In the standard case, an individual commits to a life plan at Time
One and promises never to exit-for example, he might enter a strict
monastery and sign a contract promising to remain for the rest of his
life. At Time Two, he decides he would like to change his mind and
leave. The question is whether the state best promotes his autonomy
by permitting his exit at Time Two or by enforcing his Time One
promise. If we emphasize the importance of revisability of life plans,
the state should not enforce the contract. If we put decisive weight,
instead, on the coherence of a single life and the importance of
personal accountability, the state should enforce the original promise.
The question is so perplexing that some noted theorists have simply
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set it aside. Among those who offer an answer, some emphasize the
value of revisability, although there is not a clear consensus.73
But the precommitment problem is a red herring in this case. The
"No Exit" obligation does not apply only to those parents who choose
to make a "No Exit" promise at Time One and then change their
mind. Instead, the state properly imposes a "No Exit" obligation at
Time One and enforces it at Time Two, whether or not parents endorse
the "No Exit" condition at either time. The question is whether such a
universally applicable regulation should be understood as a limitation
on parents' autonomy.
True, the "No Exit" obligation creates the appearance of
precommitment. Every parent should understand the "No Exit"
obligation at Time 1, when he chooses to have a child. In this sense,
he promises to abide by the "No Exit" obligation when he undertakes
the task of child-rearing. But the state should not be able to justify
draconian restrictions on autonomy simply by giving notice ahead of
time. The question is whether the social role is itself fairly defined-is
the state fairly assigning duties and rights to parents and the
childless-a question to which the precommitment problem provides
no answer.
D. Society's Obligationto Parents
Still, the central question remains: Why should the childless help
pay to protect parents' autonomy? After all, the childless have lives
of their own to live. If they must pay taxes to create programs for
parents, they will suffer some diminution in the opportunities they
might have pursued. Why is that fair?
To set the stage, return to the normative argument for continuity of
care. A fair society, as I have argued in Part II, should aim to
recognize and foster the autonomy of every person.74 In such a
society, every child would be entitled to the conditions of autonomy,
including continuity of care and a parent subject to the "No Exit" rule.
Every adult who had received the conditions of autonomy would
partake of an obligation to reproduce those conditions for the next
generation.
This part adds a second insight: Such a society should also act with
due regard for the impact of its child-rearing practices on parents'
autonomy too. The underlying value is that each citizen should have
some ongoing capacity to participate in the enterprise of defining and
pursuing a life of his own choosing. But if that is true, then the state
should not be indifferent to how it secures the conditions of autonomy
for children. If the ideal is that everyone should enjoy the lifelong
73. See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 197-99; Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self 81-87
(1986).
74. See supra notes 21-66 and accompanying text.
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capacity to form, refine, and pursue a vision of the good, then it is
insufficient to focus on children alone: We owe some consideration as
well to the conditions of autonomy for adults.
There are many different accounts of society's obligation to
safeguard adults' autonomy. Consider two that seem especially apt
for my purposes. First, an egalitarian society commonly takes
measures to preserve individual autonomy against its citizens'
predictable failure to do so. Put another way, society often expects
some adults to help preserve other adults from choices that may
ultimately damage their life chances. The conceptual problem is that
life-planning is a difficult enterprise, because it requires one's younger
self to empathize with an older self in different circumstances. In
theory, we could hold each individual strictly responsible for planning
for old age, unemployment, and bad health, but because it is so
pervasively difficult for people to imagine themselves in difficult
circumstances, we rely on mandatory, public social insurance to
protect people who suffer predictable, but serious, injuries to their life
chances: for instance, the elderly, the unemployed, and the sick.75
Public old-age insurance can be understood in exactly this way: We
provide public pensions and medical care for the elderly because we
know that many people will underestimate the financial and medical
needs of old age. We could dismiss the plight of the elderly by
insisting that they chose not to save (or to lead financially imprudent
or unhealthy lives). But instead, we understand that there is a very
human difficulty in planning so far ahead. How many twenty-oneyear-olds can really empathize with the frailties of the eighty-year-olds
they may become?
It might seem that it is far easier for people to anticipate
parenthood. Most parents are relatively young, in their twenties or
thirties, and most of them know plenty of other parents. But many
new parents find, to their horror, that they really didn't understand
what they were getting into. Anticipating a new baby to love is one
thing; facing the day-to-day and year-to-year dilemmas of parenthood
is quite different. The analogy to old age isn't perfect, but it has some
resonance. After all, we all know plenty of old people, but many of us
don't begin to empathize until the first pains and small disabilities of
middle age, or a first spell of unemployment, give us a hint of what it
will be like to feel ill and financially vulnerable beyond our working
years.
Parents' economic situation also resembles the plight of what policy
wonks call "displaced" workers-that is, workers who chose one
occupation, only to find that globalization or technological change
have made their skills obsolete. Skilled factory workers, telephone
75. See generally Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society
(1999).

20041

CHILDREN IN THE FAIR SOCIETY

1971

operators, and others have found themselves in middle age with skills
no longer needed in a high-tech, information-based economy. We
might dismiss their situation-after all, they chose their jobs. But,
instead, we have made some public provision for unemployment
insurance and retraining assistance to help them retool for the new
economy. The situation of parents is a bit different: It isn't
technological change that has unexpectedly shrunk their
opportunities, but instead the predictable demands of child-rearing in
a society that demands "No Exit." But technological change isn't
instantaneous: Telephone operators and factory workers could have
exited sooner for different jobs, while parents cannot.
Seana Shiffrin offers a more general account of when a society
might act to assist some adults from bearing the autonomy
consequences of their own life choices. 6 She points out that our
society does not strictly call its citizens to account for the full costs of
their choices. We do not require smokers, drinkers, or motorcycle
enthusiasts to pay the full cost of their health care, even though their
own choices contribute to their higher rates of illness and injury.
Nonreligious employers may be required by law to permit religious
people not to work on their Sabbath. Workers who care for children
or elderly parents have a right to take job leave without penalty. And
so on.
All these practices, Shiffrin points out, involve a collective effort to
make some choices less costly than they would otherwise be, even
though smokers choose to smoke; Sabbatarians choose to be religious;
and parents choose to have children. Why do we do this? There are
many possible explanations, but Shiffrin suggests that too-strict costaccounting would chill people's capacity to deliberate about the lives
they wish to lead.
For some readers, these accounts of collective obligation will be
quite sufficient to justify the obligations of the childless to help lighten
parents' load. These accounts suggest that parenthood is just one
among many "costly choices" that people make-and that society
protects their ability to make.
But other readers may object. In theory, at least, the state need not
tax the childless to protect parents: The law might require parents
themselves to set aside resources to counter the burden of the "No
Exit" obligation. Perhaps every person who could potentially be a
parent should be required to contribute to a special savings account to
draw on if she ever became a parent. (Those who remained childless
would receive refunds.) That kind of regime would ensure that
parents paid the full cost of child-rearing-not only the direct costs of

76. Seana V. Shiffrin, Egalitarianism,Choice-Sensitivity, and Accommodation, in
Reasons and Values: Themes from the Work of Joseph Raz (Samuel Scheffler ed.,
forthcoming 2004).
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feeding and clothing the children, but also the cost of "rehabilitating"
the parents' own opportunity set.
Call this the private-project objection. This view insists that every
adult should bear the costs of her own actions. According to this way
of thinking, parents bring children into the world and should take full
responsibility for the costs of rearing them. After all, if it weren't for
the (biological) parents, there wouldn't be any child who could lay
claim to society's resources for her upbringing.7 7
But this account of causation is far too simple. True, parents
choose to have children, and children require costly care. In addition,
parents have considerable latitude in deciding how expensively and
intensively to rear their children. At the same time, however, society
regulates child-rearing with a heavy hand. Children are people, not
projects, and parents cannot entirely rear their children as they
choose. The "No Exit" story attempts to draw out this second
strand-to highlight the state's deliberate role even in parental
continuity of care, that most intimate and basic of parental functions.
In principle, causation cannot resolve the question. The privateproject objection emphasizes parents' role in creating children. But
we could just as easily emphasize the state's role in subjecting parents
to the "No Exit" duty. We could even highlight children's role in the
matter. Why should parents have to pay for the conditions of
autonomy for other people (their children)? Why shouldn't children
themselves (once grown to adulthood) be obliged to repay the cost of
their own upbringing?
None of these three "theories" of causation reaches the bedrock
issues here. In fact, the causal claim ("parents cause children to
exist") isn't really about causation at all. Instead, it is a shorthand for
a deeper judgment about the appropriate baseline distribution of
society's resources. Implicitly, the claim is that every adult deserves
an equal share of resources, ex ante, and thereafter no one may claim
more (or be required to take less) based on his or her choices about
how to live. That thesis has a respectable lineage in liberal, egalitarian
theories. But a closer look suggests that the classical account of
resource equality does not fully come to terms with society's role in
making parenthood a "No Exit" obligation.
E. Is Child-Rearingan Expensive Taste?
Liberal egalitarian theorists typically endorse the principle of
resource equality-the idea that every person should enjoy an equal
share of society's wealth. While each individual may dispose of her
share as she sees fit, she should accept the consequences of her
choices, and she generally should not expect others to give her extra

77. See generally Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (1991).
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resources if she chooses an expensive way of life. Dworkin's classic
example is that it would be unfair to redistribute from the beerdrinker to the champagne connoisseur.7 8 By hypothesis, both the
beer-drinker and the champagne-drinker had an equal endowment of
resources, and an equal capacity to make choices about how to live. If
the champagne-drinker chooses the more expensive beverage, she
should not be able to complain that she can buy fewer bottles than her
beer-drinking peer.
By analogy, the parent and the non-parent both begin with equal
opportunities, and (at least in theory) equal resources, ex ante. If the
parent, like the champagne-drinker, chooses to indulge a taste that is
expensive-in terms of time or money-she will simply have fewer
resources left for other pursuits. Her choice cannot authorize her to
claim greater resources than her childless peer-because the parent
could just as well have chosen a "cheaper" way of life, just as the
champagne drinker might select a cheaper libation.
A familiar (and important) reply is that, in the real world, one's
parental role is not entirely freely chosen. In particular, gender
unfairly allocates a disproportionate share of child-rearing work to
women. I incorporate gender into the policies I consider in "No Exit";
in moving from theory to real-world implementation, it is crucial to
recognize the linkage between gender inequality and child-rearing.
But at this point, I want to bracket the gender question. Even today,
there is some element of choice involved in child-rearing: Some
women choose not to rear children, and some men choose to do so. It
is one thing to believe (as I do) that the conditions for choice are not
presently fair; it is another to suppose that caretaking is so involuntary
a choice that women should bear no responsibility for it.
Instead of going down that road, I want to address the problem at a
higher level of abstraction: Even if all parents freely choose their
project, they still should not bear alone the autonomy burden of the
"No Exit" obligation. Even in a gender-free society, the "No Exit"
obligation would render caretaking quite unlike the usual beer-andchampagne examples. Child-rearing is expensive not because of the
operation of market competition among equally-endowed individuals
but because the state must subject parents to the "No Exit" obligation
in order to protect continuity of care for children.
The usual context for the expensive tastes debate is this: In liberal
theory, markets that operate against a background of fair distribution
are themselves fair. If we all enter the marketplace with strictly equal
resources, then none of us should complain about the prices that
result from bidding. If champagne is expensive and beer cheap, the
pricing reflects the opportunity cost of the resources involved to our
78. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 32; Dworkin, Equality of
Resources, supra note 32.
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fellow citizens. I should not be able to buy champagne at $1 per bottle
if the growers value the alternative uses of the land and labor more
highly than that. My claim for cheap champagne would be, in effect, a
claim to conscript others' resources and opportunities.
But the "No Exit" obligation does not "price" parenthood based on
a fair auction process in which individuals compete for resources.
Instead it represents a deliberate and necessary social regulation of
parents' lives-in effect, a conscription of their time. The fact of
Many life projects are
regulation is not, of course, unusual.
legitimately the subject of state regulation that renders them more
expensive than otherwise. The preclusion of exit represents an
extraordinary erosion of the preconditions for autonomy. The "No
Exit" obligation represents an exceedingly rare exercise of a power
that only the state should wield-the power to prevent citizens from
revising their conception of the good. The state should exercise that
power rarely; and when the exercise of that power is justified by some
collective aim, society as a whole should take part in ameliorating the
consequences for individual autonomy.
Put another way, parenthood is a private project and an expensive
taste only if you accept the premise that strict equality of resources, ex
The "No Exit" argument challenges that
ante, is appropriate.
premise: My claim is that when society so heavily regulates just one
social role, and in a way that fundamentally compromises the
autonomy of people who choose that role, society may owe such
people something more than their initial, ex ante, equal share of
resources. The "No Exit" theory challenges the implicit assumption
that underlies the objection that childless people are unfairly being
taxed to "subsidize" parents.
Still, the expensive taste objection has greater force when we
consider costs of parenthood beyond the "No Exit" obligation itself.
Parents have considerable latitude in meeting the demands of the "No
Exit" obligation, and parents differ in their tastes and ambitions.
Parenthood will be relatively cheap for those whose plans are
extremely flexible, whose child-rearing style is casual, and whose life
It will be far more
projects can flourish despite interruption.
expensive for those whose child-rearing style is intensive and whose
projects can be easily derailed by interruption. Nothing in the "No
Exit" argument seeks to justify greater compensation to the latter
group.
What I am suggesting is that it may be best to think of child-rearing
as an endeavor with both public and private costs. Parents should be
responsible for costs that reflect their "private" taste for resource
consumption (in lifestyle and style of child-rearing), but the childless
should bear some responsibility for ensuring that each child has access
to the (publicly-defined) conditions of autonomy, especially when the
state's mandate proves extraordinarily costly for ordinary parents.
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The "No Exit" obligation is one example of a state mandate of this
heavily costly type. Education is probably another. As an empirical
matter, it would be prohibitively costly for most ordinary families to
pay the full cost of adequate schooling for their children. We do not
expect families to do so; instead, we provide public schools. Although
the childless (and those whose children are grown) sometimes protest
that they are overtaxed to pay for the schools, we seem to understand
that schools represent a collective obligation to the next generation of
children. Interestingly, even some theorists who take the position that
parents should pay for the costs of child-rearing seem to anticipate
that the public should fund children's education.79
I recognize that this is only a beginning, and not a full-fledged
theory of how society and parents should share the costs of childrearing. When should we consider public mandates for child-rearing
to be extraordinarily burdensome for parents' lives? How would the
theory apply to children's health care? To college education? My
present aim is to start by showing that even continuity of care, that
very private and intimate aspect of parenthood, has a public aspect as
well, and that there is a plausible rationale for collective measures to
assist parents who provide continuity to their children.
F. Public Goods and Public Obligations
It may seem that the preceding sections labor too hard to craft a
distinctive justification for redistribution to parents, when there is an
easier one at hand. Many theorists and policy makers have argued
that children benefit society as a whole and that, therefore, every
member of society has an obligation to help defray the costs of childrearing."
The logic is that children improve the society-they
generate new cultural and economic opportunities that in some sense
enrich us all. Thus, the argument concludes, the childless benefit from
children's care, too, and so they should help fund it.
But the public-goods theory has characteristic weak points. The
classic reply is that the childless should not be obliged to help pay the
costs of child-rearing, even if children do benefit them, because the
childless have not asked for (or consented to) the benefits they
receive. The logic is that children are not necessary to liberal society.
We could imagine a fair society in which everyone decided to remain
childless. That society would crumble, which might be unfortunate,
but it would not be unfair. Anyone who objected should have

79. Ackerman argues that parents should post a bond to pay the cost of their
children's share of social resources, but he also seems to anticipate that the state
should both operate and fund the public schools. See generally Ackerman, supra note

30.
80. See, e.g., Nancy Folbre, The Invisible Heart 49-51, 109-13 (2001); Rolf George,
Who Should Bear the Cost of Children?, 1 Pub. Aff. Q. 1 (1987).
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children of his own; he should not demand that others do so. 8
According to this line of argument, it is beside the point that present
institutions-the economy or the Social Security system-presume
that younger workers will step up to support older ones. The current
generation has no right to live up to a certain standard based on the
presence of children. Because the benefits of children to third parties
are unasked-for, the argument concludes, parents should not expect
state compensation for the costs of child-rearing. Although the
childless may benefit from parents' work, those parents undertook
their work voluntarily and without promise of any extra reward.82
In contrast, the "No Exit" theory centers on mutual obligation,
instead of (as public-goods theories do) mutual benefit. The claim is
that every child has a right to claim developmental resources from
society and that every adult has an obligation to help secure such
resources for the next generation of children. The obligation follows
from a relationship of obligation from the childless to their peers who
are parents (or from children to the parents who reared them)-and
not from the benefit that children provide to their elders.
The argument-from-obligation is not vulnerable to the involuntarybenefits objection, at least not in quite the same form. Society's
obligation to parents does not arise because children benefit the rest
of us (perhaps they do, perhaps they do not), but because an
egalitarian society must accord dignified treatment to every human
being: We owe each new generation the conditions of autonomy even
if we do not benefit from their presence.
Some theorists justify a social obligation to parents by proposing
that children are necessary for society. 83 But my argument is agnostic
on that score. Instead, my point is that when children do come into
being, parents and the larger society must undertake special
obligations to secure them the conditions of autonomy. It is children's
(and parents') value as human beings, and not their economic or
social contribution to collective life, that justifies the state's obligation.
The public goods argument can avoid the involuntary-benefit
objection only by making a move that brings the second empirical
objection to the fore. An advocate of the public goods theory might
reply that even though children are not strictly necessary to society,
many childless people would likely pay something to keep the
economy going and the culture flourishing in their old age. Like any
public good, children (and children's care) may be under-provided
unless the state provides extra compensation in order to align parents'
incentives with the collective interest." Collective action problems
81. See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 109-11.
82. See Rakowski, supra note 77, at 153-55.
83. For one example, see John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1997).
84. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 191-93.
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probably would prevent those people from organizing to pay wouldbe parents, and so the state should step in and act on their behalf.
Those who would willingly retire in a cave to chew acorns and read
moldy books by the light of the last few candles will feel themselves
overtaxed. The rest of us (let us suppose) would endorse some level
of taxation for the benefit of children and their parents in order to
keep the lights on and Social Security paying out.
But it is not obvious, as an empirical matter, that the childless
would be willing to pay much for the net benefits that children
generate. Although it would be impossible to calculate a definite sum,
it is not even clear that the net payment would be positive. Children
create negative externalities as well as positive ones. Overpopulation,
urban crowding, clogged highways, and overburdened public utilities
and parks come to mind on the negative side. Younger people in
general are more likely to engage in crime, violence, and risky
behavior that harm others (driving too fast, for example). Advocates
of "child-free" living also note the intrusion of children into adult
social life-in restaurants, housing, and so on.85
The public-goods theory also has troubling implications for the
distribution of rewards to parents. On a strict interpretation, the goal
should be to produce children who are well-socialized, law-abiding,
economically productive, or culturally interesting. But not all parents
are equally good at rearing such children, and there is no reason to
suppose that financial redistribution would improve their capabilities.
Parents might be taught to perform better-by attending child-rearing
classes, for example-but that kind of redistribution would not do
much for parents' own life-planning opportunities. Alternatively, the
public-goods rationale may support institutions that improve
children's circumstances while circumventing parents. The state could
deploy resources for day care, preschools, and health clinics in order
to enhance children's outcomes without requiring judgments about
the merits of different parents.
The "No Exit" theory is subtly, but importantly, different. It aims
to capture more directly the state's obligation to each individual
parent-an obligation that cannot be circumvented by selective
redistribution to "good" parents, or by the creation of schools and
other resources that benefit only children. The key is the "No Exit"
obligation, which both defines parents' obligations and binds the state
to take measures to alleviate its burden.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parents make a private decision to have children, but when they do
so, they also step into a public role. Every child deserves the parental
care she needs to develop her autonomy and take her place in adult
85. See generally Elinor Burkett, The Baby Boon (2000).
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life, but every parent deserves the chance to provide that care while
leading a life of her own. A fair society should expect parents to care
for their children and to sacrifice time and opportunity if necessary,
but it should also help parents preserve a reasonable range of life
options during and after their years of care.
The "No Exit" obligation is more than a theoretical problem. It is a
serious economic problem for parents, and especially for mothers.
Most parents-and most mothers-provide continuity of care to their
children. But in the process, too many drift toward the margins of
economic life. Study after study confirms that mothers in every
income class compromise their working lives in order to provide their
children with continuity of care.86 Mothers work less, earn less, and
achieve less than men-and than childless women. Job interruptions
take their toll on mothers' earning power. Even when mothers stay in
the race and accumulate the same credentials as their childless
counterparts, they still earn less.
Over the long term, work
disruptions and lower earnings take their toll. Mothers are terribly
vulnerable at divorce and accumulate less financial security for old
age.
Changing gender roles have not saved the day. Although more
mothers hold jobs now, they still bear primary responsibility for childrearing. To be sure, attitudes have evolved, and fathers do more now
than a generation ago, but the rate of change in actual behavior has
been slow. On average, it is still the mother who manages the
household, identifies the children's needs, and takes responsibility
when children are sick, schools close, or the babysitter quits. But even
if mothers' and fathers' roles could magically be equalized, the hard
fact is that child-rearing requires intensive emotional work and a large
time commitment-for 18 years or more.
But parents' present economic position reflects a failure of social
policy and not a law of nature. It is both practical and affordable to
create new programs to assist parents who live up to their obligation
of care. Public policy can help ensure that these parents have the
opportunity to combine child-rearing with independent projects over
a lifetime.
In No Exit, I propose two new programs designed to enhance
parents' long-term economic opportunities.
Although I cannot
provide more in this Article than a brief description, the two
initiatives begin to suggest how public policy might aim to serve
parents in a wide range of economic circumstances-and to respect

86. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin, Careerand Family: College Women Look to the Past,
in Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace 20 (1997); Jane Waldfogel, The Effect
of Children on Women's Wages, 62 Am. Soc. Rev. 209 (1997); Jane Waldfogel,
Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, 12 J. Econ. Persp.
137 (1998).
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parents' own judgments about how to combine paid work with childrearing.
The first program, caretaker resource accounts, would provide
parents with financial resources to help remain in-or re-enter-the
mainstream of economic life. The program would give parents an
annual grant of $5,000, which could be used for any of three
purposes-child care, the caretaker's own education, or the
caretaker's retirement. Each individual could choose how best to use
the funds to further her own plans, but every option would improve
parents' long-term economic prospects.
The second program, life-planning insurance,would offer extra help
to the parents of children with serious illnesses or disabilities-job
leave, income support, and supportive social services. The idea is that
caretaker resource accounts would provide a standard package to all
parents, while life-planning insurance would offer more individualized
assistance to those whose children suffer severe illness or disability.
These ideas raise many questions. As a normative matter, why do I
focus on child-rearing rather than care for vulnerable individuals? As
an empirical matter, how heavy are the costs of child-rearing? And
from a practical standpoint, isn't there a danger that rewarding
parenthood will worsen women's situation, by making traditional
gender roles more appealing?
There are also a host of institutional details that merit attention.
How much would the proposed programs cost? Would they require
expensive, and intrusive, new bureaucracies? Why aren't existing
programs sufficient? And, given my commitment to assisting parents,
why don't I embrace more familiar proposals for "family-friendly"
workplace reforms that would guarantee parents access to flex-time
and part-time work?
This Article motivates these questions, but it cannot do more.
Readers will find a fuller exposition in No Exit.

Notes & Observations

